William Kristol: How To Make the Iraq War Much, Much Worse

William Kristol suggests Iran’s abandonment of its nuclear weapons program in 2003 is the result of our invasion of Iraq that same year. So rather than arguing for an altered stance toward Iran, he sees the new NIE as an encouragement to get even tougher, both in Iran and Iraq:

“But if one chooses not to be fatalistic [about the inevitability of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons], and to think about what might induce an Iranian ‘political decision’ to abandon its nuclear program, part of the answer, surely, is a more robust effort to pressure the Iranian regime. Another part is the credible use of force--as in 2003.

The final part is victory in Iraq. President Bush's successful shift in strategy in Iraq a year ago, as part of his commitment to finishing that job, remains his greatest contribution to peace in the Middle East. The complete and unequivocal defeat of al Qaeda and of Iranian-backed proxies in Iraq is the best way to show Iran that the United States is a serious power to be reckoned with in the region.”

Kristol’s argument for his claim consists entirely of noting that Iran’s weapons program ended after the Iraq war began. It shouldn’t need mentioning, but this reasoning is so famously bad that it has its own name: post hoc, ergo propter hoc. Just 4 days after US seized control of Baghdad airport, Syracuse won the NCAA Championship, coincidence? The final score was 81-78. The US suffered exactly 81 casualties in Feb. of this year and exactly 78 in July, "surely," you can see the connection?

Another "credible use of force," this time against 89% Shia Iran, is the single most efficient way to dramatically worsen the situation in Iraq. Now, Iraq's 60% Shia population is more favorably disposed towards the occupation and (naturally) more supportive of the objective of a Shia-led national government than the Sunni minority. This is reflected in the findings of the latest (12/3/07) Iraq Index:

Q: How would you say things are going in Iraq overall these days?

“Very bad” Sunni: 60% Shia: 20%

Q: Do you support the presence of coalition troops in Iraq?

“Strongly/somewhat support” Sunni: 2% Shia: 20%

Q: Do you think your children will have a better life than you, worse, or about the same?

“Better” Sunni: 7% Shia 55%

Q: Do you approve or disapprove of the way Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki is handling his job?

“Approve” Sunni: 3% Shia 67%

Q: What is your expectation for how things will be for Iraq a year from now?

“Much or somewhat better” Sunni: 5% Shia 61%

Q: Do you approve or disapprove (strongly or somewhat) of attacks on US-led forces in Iraq?

“Approve” Sunni:88% Shia: 41%

While now more tolerant of occupation and more favorably disposed toward the goals of the current government, tolerance and cooperation will end if Iran is attacked. The Iranian and Iraqi Shia communities have strong connections. Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, leader of Iraqi Shia, is an Iranian national. A US attack on Iran will be viewed by Shia Iraq as an attack on Shias. The consequence aren't hard to foresee.

In addition to alienating Iraqi Shia, Iranian Shia who now judge a Shia-led Iraq to be in Iran's best interests are likely to dramatically alter their view:

“. . .in the event of an attack on Iran, this calculus would likely yield to a desire for revenge. In such a scenario, Iranian Revolutionary Guards could cross the border in great numbers to promote a full-blown guerrilla war against the large U.S. presence in Iraq. Iranian intelligence agents, who are currently in Iraq in significant numbers, could provoke clashes between the U.S. forces and Shi'a majority, precipitating a general uprising against Coalition forces in Iraq. It is important to note that, unlike the foreign Salafi Jihadi fighters (a la Abu Musab al Zarqawi and his Tawhid network) who infiltrated Iraq to fight the Americans and are despised by the Iraqi Shi'a, Iranian infiltrators in Iraq are likely to be seen by Iraqi Shi'a in a very different light.”

. . .

“In the event of an American or Israeli attack on Iran's nuclear facilities, it is likely that Iran would attempt to take advantage of its extensive list of allies in Iraq to further sour the U.S. occupation and provoke clashes between U.S. troops and Iraqi Shi'a, which may well result in a popular Iraqi Shi'a uprising against the American presence in Iraq. In such an event, American casualties and costs would multiply exponentially as Iraq further disintegrates into Lebanon-style violence. Such developments would prove disastrous for U.S. interests in the Middle East and negate any perceived or actual benefits that may be gained from destroying Iran's nuclear facilities. The fact is that the strategic usefulness of a successful preemptive attack on Iran's nuclear facilities is likely to be short-lived if the United States gets further bogged down in Iraq.”

[From: A Preemptive Attack on Iran's Nuclear Facilities: Possible Consequences
by Sammy Salama and Karen Ruster, August 12, 2004]

So far from stabilizing the Middle East, another "robust" Iraq-style “credible use of force--as in 2003” would alienate now favorably disposed Iraqi Shias and unite them with their Sunni counterparts in the common goal of violence toward US forces. Aided by an influx of Iranian Shias bent on revenge for an attack on their country, Iraq would descend even further into bloody chaos.