The Status of Iraqi Security Forces: Not Taking Over Any Time Soon

"We can stand down when the Iraqis stand up." If this slogan means anything, it means that American troops can finally leave Iraq when Iraqi security forces are capable of independent operation, that is, when they have achieved “Operational Readiness Assessment Level 1,” and are:

“fully capable of planning, executing, and sustaining independent operations”

How many Iraqi army battalions are now at ORA level 1? There is currently no publicly available answer to that question. But in what public information is available, the likely answer that emerges is “none.”

The number of ORA level 1 troops in Iraq used to be public information, updated every 3 months:

In June 2005, 3 out of 100 Iraqi battalions were said to be at level 1 combat readiness, that is, capable of independent operation.

Three months later, in Sept 2005, 1 battalion out of 100 was at level 1 readiness.

In Feb. 2006, not a single Iraqi battalion was judged capable of independent operation.

In August 2006, how many Iraqi battalions were at level 1 readiness? Sorry, citizen, that information is now classified:

“The decision to stop making the information public came after reports showed a steady decline in the number of qualified Iraqi units. That number now is classified, said Air Force Lt. Gen. Victor Renuart, director of strategic plans and policy for the Joint Chiefs of Staff.”

The readiness of US trained Iraqi forces, as measured in ORA's or TRA's (Transitional Readiness Assessments) is still unavailable, apparently even to Congress:

“The Defense Department has resisted auditors' efforts to obtain data on the military readiness of U.S.-trained Iraqi troops, according to a senior government official.

Comptroller General David M. Walker told audience members at a Government Executive breakfast Wednesday that Defense has not complied with repeated Government Accountability Office requests for evaluations of Iraqi troop preparedness, known as transitional readiness assessments. The Pentagon develops those evaluations for Iraqi and U.S. forces, Walker said, and has a statutory obligation to release them to GAO.”

In addition to classifying the ORAs of Iraqi troops, Something else happened in 2006, the definition of ORA Level 1 in reference to Iraqi troop units was altered from:

“A Level 1 unit is fully capable of planning, executing, and sustaining independent operations.”

to

“A Level 1 unit is capable of planning, executing, and sustaining counterinsurgency operations.”

In fact, with "fully" and "independent" now omitted from the definition, the new definition of level 1 is essentially identical to the old definition of level 2. These definitions are from a July 2005 report to Congress:

“A Level 1 unit is fully capable of planning, executing, and sustaining
independent counterinsurgency operations.”

“A Level 2 unit is capable of planning, executing, and sustaining
counterinsurgency operations with coalition support.”

In the 2006 redefinition of level 1, the omission of “fully” and “independent” implies, rather than directly states, the requirement for coalition support.

In the Initial “Benchmark Assessment Report” issued in Sept '07 the Whitehouse employs the language of “independence” in relation to operational readiness, but now, instead of defining ORA Level 1 in terms of full independence, "independence" is defined in terms of the new 2006 Level 1:

“There are 9 Iraqi Army divisions, 31 Brigades, and 95 battalions in the operational lead for their area of responsibility. For an Iraqi unit to be designated capable of independent operations, it must achieve an Operational Readiness Assessment (ORA) Level 1 status. There has been a slight reduction in units assessed as capable of independent operations since January 2007.”

Whereas achieving the old ORA level 1 meant the attainment of “fully independent” capability, now the capacity for “independent operation” means achieving the new 2006 ORA Level 1 (= the 2005 Level 2) status. That is, a unit "capable of independent operations" is now defined as one capable of operation with coalition support (with the need for support implied in the new definition of level 1, and explicitly noted in the new definition of level 2). This version of the report notes a “slight reduction” in troop numbers at the new level 1.

In the Final Benchmark Report issued in Sept. ‘07, this language has been altered to more prominently feature the idea of Iraqi troop unit "independence:"

“Since March 2007, there has been a 14 percent increase in the number of independent Iraqi Army operations, including 20 units operating independently as part of Fardh Al-Qanoon and 10 units assuming the lead role in their areas of responsibility. While only a small percentage of battalions are rated as capable of completely independent counterinsurgency operations (Operational Readiness Assessment Level One), over 75 percent are capable of planning, executing, and sustaining operations with some Coalition support and of making significant contributions to combat operations.”

Is “completely independent” being used here in a conventional or an idiosyncratic sense? Is the “small percentage” of battalions at ORA level 1 at the new or the old level 1?
The Report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq also released in Sept ‘07 makes it clear that the“independent" capability of Iraqi forces is to be understood in its new sense, that is, as meaning “still requiring coalition support.”

If any Iraqi troop units are at ORA level 1 as originally defined (and as it it used in the assessment of US combat units) and are thus truly "completely independent," it would be those new level 1 units capable of operation without coalition support. The Commission Report makes it clear that there are no Iraqi forces with this capability. Even the 1500 man Iraqi Special Operations Forces brigade, “the most capable element of the Iraqi armed forces ” lacks the ability for true independent operation:

“Iraqi Special Operations Forces are and are well-trained in both individual and collective skills. They are currently capable of leading counterterrorism operations, but they continue to require Coalition support. They remain dependent on the Coalition for many combat enablers, especially airlift, close air support, and targeting intelligence.”

Overall:

“The Iraqi armed forces—Army, Special Forces, Navy, and Air Force—are increasingly effective and are capable of assuming greater responsibility for the internal security of Iraq; and the Iraqi police are improving, but not at a rate sufficient to meet their essential security responsibilities. The Iraqi Security Forces [ISF] will continue to rely on the Coalition to provide key enablers such as combat support (aviation support, intelligence, and communications), combat service support (logistics, supply chain management, and maintenance), and training. The Commission assesses that in the next 12 to 18 months there will be continued improvement in their readiness and capability, but not the ability to operate independently.” p.12

Despite the (deliberate) ambiguity in government accounts of Iraqi troop unit capabilities, e.g., the re-definition of ORA “level 1” without the use of the term “independent,” coupled with the continued use of that term (without explicit definition) in describing operational readiness, what emerges from public accounts is a picture of an Iraqi military with some increasingly capable units (special operations) but with a continued overall dependence on coalition (US) forces that is “substantial at times.” p.37

“Although the ISF have made significant progress in many areas, the Commission finds that they are not yet able to execute these missions independently. Without continued combat support, combat service support, and assistance from Coalition Military Transition Teams, it is unlikely that the ISF will achieve, in the near term, the proficiency and readiness needed to provide security for Iraq.” p. 35

The truth of the matter seems to be that Iraqi forces are no where near ready to take over the tasks now performed by US forces. They show no sign of being able to do so in the near and even the not-so-near future. If we can stand down only when Iraqis stand up, we're going to be standing a long , long time.